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Abstract
This note proposes various axiomatizations of contingency logic under neigh-
borhood semantics. In particular, by defining a suitable canonical neighborhood
function, we give sound and complete axiomatizations of monotone contingency
logic and regular contingency logic, thereby answering two open questions raised
by Bakhtiari, van Ditmarsch, and Hansen. The canonical function is inspired by
a function proposed by Kuhn in 1995. We show that Kuhn’s function is actually
equal to a related function originally given by Humberstone.
Keywords: contingency logic, neighborhood semantics, axiomatization, monotone lo-
gic, regular logic
1 Introduction
Compared to normal modal logics, non-normal modal logics usually have many dis-
advantages, such as weak expressivity, weak frame definability, which leads to non-
triviality of axiomatizations. Contingency logic is such a logic [13, 3, 9, 11, 15, 8].
Since it was independently proposed by Scott and Montague in 1970 [14, 12], neigh-
borhood semantics has been a standard semantical tool for handling non-normal modal
logics [2].
A neighborhood semantics of contingency logic is proposed in [5]. According to
the interpretation, a formulaϕ is noncontingent, if and only if the proposition expressed
by ϕ is a neighborhood of the evaluated state, or the complement of the proposition
expressed by ϕ is a neighborhood of the evaluated state. This interpretation is in line
with the philosophical intuition of noncontingency, viz. necessarily true or necessarily
false. It is shown that contingency logic is less expressive than standard modal logic
over various neighborhood model classes, and many neighborhood frame properties
are undefinable in contingency logic. This brings about the difficulties in axiomatizing
this logic over various neighborhood frames.
To our knowledge, only the classical contingency logic, i.e. the minimal system
of contingency logic under neighborhood semantics, is presented in the literature [5].
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It is left as two open questions in [1] what the axiomatizations of monotone contin-
gency logic and regular contingency logic are. In this paper, we will answer these two
questions.
Besides, we also propose other proof systems up to the minimal contingency logic,
and show their completeness with respect to the corresponding neighborhood frames.
This will give a complete diagram which includes 8 systems, as [2, Fig. 8.1] did for
standard modal logic.
The remainder of this note is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces some
basics of contingency logic, such as its language, neighborhood semantics, axioms and
rules. Sections 3 and 4 deal with the completeness of proof systems mentioned in
Sec. 2, with or without a special axiom. The completeness proofs rely on the use of
canonical neighborhood functions. In Sec. 3, a simple canonical function is needed,
while in Sec. 4 we need a more complex canonical function, which is inspired by a
crucial function λ used in a Kripke completeness proof in the literature. We further
reflect on this λ in Section 5, and show it is in fact equal to a related but complicated
function originally given by Humberstone. We conclude with some discussions in
Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this note, we fix P to be a denumerable set of propositional variables. The
language L(∆) of contingency logic is defined recursively as follows:
ϕ ::= p ∈ P | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∆ϕ.
∆ϕ is read “it is non-contingent that ϕ”. The contingency operator∇ abbreviates ¬∆.
It does not matter which one of∆ and∇ is taken as primitive.
The neighborhood semantics of L(∆) is interpreted on neighborhood models. To
say a tripleM = 〈S,N, V 〉 is a neighborhood model, if S is a nonempty set of states,
N : S → P(P(S)) is a neighborhood function, and V is a valuation.
The following list of neighborhood properties is taken from [5, Def. 3].
Definition 1 (Neighborhood properties).
(n): N(s) contains the unit, if S ∈ N(s).
(i): N(s) is closed under intersections, if X,Y ∈ N(s) implies X ∩ Y ∈ N(s).
(s): N(s) is supplemented, or closed under supersets, ifX ∈ N(s) andX ⊆ Y ⊆
S implies Y ∈ N(s).
(c): N(s) is closed under complements, if X ∈ N(s) implies S\X ∈ N(s).
Frame F = 〈S,N〉 (and the corresponding model) possesses such a property P,
if N(s) has the property P for each s ∈ S, and we call the frame (resp. the model)
P-frame (resp. P-model). Especially, a frame is called quasi-filter, if it possesses (i)
and (s); a frame is called filter, if it has also (n).
Given a neighborhood modelM = 〈S,N, V 〉 and a state s ∈ S, the semantics of
ϕ ∈ L(∆) is defined as follows [5], where ϕM = {s ∈ S | M, s  ϕ} is the truth set
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of ϕ (i.e. the proposition expressed by ϕ) inM.
M, s  p ⇐⇒ s ∈ V (p)
M, s  ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s 2 ϕ
M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, s  ϕ andM, s  ψ
M, s  ∆ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕM ∈ N(s) or S\ϕM ∈ N(s)
Our discussions will be based on the following axioms and rules.
TAUT all instances of tautologies
∆Equ ∆ϕ↔ ∆¬ϕ
∆M ∆ϕ→ ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨∆(¬ϕ ∨ χ)
∆C ∆ϕ ∧∆ψ → ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ)
∆N ∆⊤
RE∆
ϕ↔ ψ
∆ϕ↔ ∆ψ
We will show that the following systems are sound and strongly complete with
respect to the class of their corresponding frame classes.
systems frame classes
E
∆ = TAUT+∆Equ+ RE∆ all
M
∆ = E∆ +∆M (s)
(EC)∆ = E∆ +∆C (i)&(c)
(EN)∆ = E∆ +∆N (n)
R
∆ = M∆ +∆C quasi-filters
(EMN)∆ = M∆ +∆N (s)&(n)
(ECN)∆ = (EC)∆ +∆N (i)&(c)&(n)
K
∆ = R∆ +∆N filters
Given a system Λ and a maximal consistent set Sc for Λ, let |ϕ|Λ be the proof set of
ϕ in Λ; in symbol, |ϕ|Λ = {s ∈ S
c | ϕ ∈ s}. It is easy to show that |¬ϕ|Λ = S
c\|ϕ|Λ.
We always omit the subscript Λ when it is clear from the context.
3 Systems excluding ∆M
Given a proof system, a standard method of showing its completeness under neighbor-
hood semantics is constructing the canonical neighborhoodmodel, where one essential
part is the definition of canonical neighborhood function.
Definition 2. Let Σ be a system excluding ∆M. A tuple Mc = 〈Sc, N c, V c〉 is a
canonical neighborhood model for Σ, if
• Sc = {s | s is a maximal consistent set for Σ},
• N c(s) = {|ϕ| | ∆ϕ ∈ s},
• V c(p) = |p|.
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Theorem 3. [5, Thm. 1] E∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class
of all neighborhood frames.
In what follows, we will extend the canonical model construction to all systems
excluding∆M listed above.
It is not hard to show that ∆C is invalid on the class of all (i)-frames, and thus
(EC)∆ is not sound (and strongly complete) with respect to the class of all frames
satisfying (i). Despite this, it is indeed sound and strongly complete with respect to a
more restricted frame class.
Theorem 4. (EC)∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all
frames satisfying (i)&(c).
Proof. By Thm. 3, it suffices to show that∆C is valid on (i)&(c)-frames, and thatN c
possesses (i) and (c). The former follows from the fact that ∆C is valid on the class
of (i)&(c)-frames under a new semantics proposed in [4] and that on (c)-frames, the
current semantics and the new semantics satisfies the same formulas.
As for the latter,∆Equ guarantees (c), and∆C provides (i).
Theorem 5. (EN)∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all
frames satisfying (n).
Proof. It suffices to show that N c possesses the property (n). This is immediate due
to∆N and the definition of N c.
By Thm. 4 and Thm. 5, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 6. (ECN)∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all
frames satisfying (i)&(c)&(n).
4 Systems including ∆M
In this section, we show that the systems including ∆M listed above are sound and
strongly complete with respect to the corresponding frame classes.
We first consider the system M∆. The following result tells us that M∆ is sound
with respect to the class of frames satisfying (s).
Proposition 7. ∆M is valid on the class of frames satisfying (s).
Proof. Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a (s)-model and s ∈ S. Suppose that M, s  ∆ϕ,
then ϕM ∈ N(s) or (¬ϕ)M ∈ N(s). If ϕM ∈ N(s), then by (s), ϕM ∪ ψM ∈
N(s), which implies M, s  ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ); if (¬ϕ)M ∈ N(s), then similarly, we can
obtainM, s  ∆(¬ϕ ∨ χ). Either case gives usM, s  ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨∆(¬ϕ ∨ χ), as
required.
For the completeness, we construct the canonical neighborhood model for M∆,
where the crucial definition is the canonical neighborhood function. The definition of
N c below is inspired by a function λ introduced in [11].1
1The difference between Nc and λ lies in the codomains: Nc’s codomain is P(P(Sc)), whereas λ’s is
P(L(∆)).
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Definition 8. Let Γ be a system including ∆M. A triple Mc = 〈Sc, N c, V c〉 is a
canonical model for Γ, if
• Sc = {s | s is a maximal consistent set for Γ},
• For each s ∈ Sc, N c(s) = {|ϕ| | ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for every ψ},
• For each p ∈ P, V c(p) = |p|.
We need to show that N c is well-defined.
Lemma 9. If |ϕ| = |ψ|, then |ϕ| ∈ N c(s) iff |ψ| ∈ N c(s).
Proof. Suppose that |ϕ| = |ψ|, then ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ, then for every χ, ⊢ ϕ∨χ↔ ψ ∨χ. By
RE∆, we have ⊢ ∆(ϕ ∨ χ)↔ ∆(ψ ∨ χ), thus for every χ,∆(ϕ ∨ χ) ∈ s iff for every
χ,∆(ψ ∨ χ) ∈ s, and therefore |ϕ| ∈ N c(s) iff |ψ| ∈ N c(s).
Lemma 10. Let Mc be a canonical model for M∆. Then for all ϕ ∈ L(∆), for all
s ∈ Sc, we haveMc, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ s, i.e. ϕM
c
= |ϕ|.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The only nontrivial case is ∆ϕ.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that ∆ϕ ∈ s but Mc, s 2 ∆ϕ. Then by induction
hypothesis, we obtain |ϕ| /∈ N c(s), and Sc\|ϕ| /∈ N c(s), i.e. |¬ϕ| /∈ N c(s). Thus
∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) /∈ s for some ψ, and ∆(¬ϕ ∨ χ) /∈ s for some χ. Using axiom ∆M, we
obtain∆ϕ /∈ s: a contradiction.
Conversely, assume thatMc, s  ∆ϕ, to show that ∆ϕ ∈ s. By assumption and
induction hypothesis, we have |ϕ| ∈ N c(s), or Sc\|ϕ| ∈ N c(s), i.e. |¬ϕ| ∈ N c(s). If
|ϕ| ∈ N c(s), then for every ψ,∆(ϕ∨ψ) ∈ s. In particular,∆ϕ ∈ s; if |¬ϕ| ∈ N c(s),
then by a similar argument, we obtain∆¬ϕ ∈ s, thus∆ϕ ∈ s. Therefore,∆ϕ ∈ s.
Note thatMc is not necessarily supplemented. Thus we need to define a notion of
supplementation, which comes from [2].
Definition 11. LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a neighborhood model. The supplementation of
M, denotedM+, is a triple 〈S,N+, V 〉, where for each s ∈ S, N+(s) is the superset
closure ofN(s), i.e. for every s ∈ S andX ⊆ S,
N+(s) = {X | Y ⊆ X for some Y ∈ N(s)}.
It is easy to see thatM+ is supplemented. Moreover, N(s) ⊆ N+(s). The proof
below is a routine work.
Proposition 12. Let M be a neighborhood model. If M possesses the property (i),
then so doesM+; ifM possesses the property (n), then so doesM+.
We will denote the supplementation of Mc by (Mc)+ = 〈Sc, (N c)+, V c〉. To
demonstrate the completeness ofM∆ with respect to the class of (s)-frames, we need
only show that (Mc)+ is a canonical model forM∆. That is,
Lemma 13. For each s ∈ Sc,
|ϕ| ∈ (N c)+(s) ⇐⇒ ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for every ψ.
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Proof. ‘⇐=’: immediate by N c(s) ⊆ (N c)+(s) for each s ∈ Sc and the definition of
N c.
‘=⇒’: Suppose that |ϕ| ∈ (N c)+(s), to show that ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for every ψ. By
supposition,X ⊆ |ϕ| for some X ∈ N c(s). Then there is a χ such that |χ| = X , and
thus∆(χ∨ψ) ∈ s for every ψ, in particular∆(χ∨ϕ∨ψ) ∈ s. From |χ| ⊆ |ϕ| follows
that ⊢ χ → ϕ, thus ⊢ χ ∨ ϕ ∨ ψ ↔ ϕ ∨ ψ, and hence ⊢ ∆(χ ∨ ϕ ∨ ψ) ↔ ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ)
by RE∆. Therefore∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for every ψ.
By Lemma 10 and Lemma 13, we have
Lemma 14. For all ϕ ∈ L(∆), for all s ∈ Sc, we have (Mc)+, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ s,
i.e. ϕ(M
c)+ = |ϕ|.
With a routine work, we obtain
Theorem 15. M∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of frames
satisfying (s).
We are now in a position to deal with the sound and strong completeness of R∆.
First, the soundness follows from the following result.
Proposition 16. ∆C is valid on the class of quasi-filters.
Proof. LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a (s)-model and s ∈ S. Suppose thatM, s  ∆ϕ∧∆ψ,
then ϕM ∈ N(s) or (¬ϕ)M ∈ N(s), and ψM ∈ N(s) or (¬ψ)M ∈ N(s). Consider
the following three cases:
• ϕM ∈ N(s) and ψM ∈ N(s). By (i), we obtain ϕM ∩ ψM ∈ N(s), i.e.
(ϕ ∧ ψ)M ∈ N(s), which givesM, s  ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ).
• (¬ϕ)M ∈ N(s). By (s), we infer (¬ϕ)M∪(¬ψ)M ∈ N(s), i.e. (¬(ϕ∧ψ))M ∈
N(s), which impliesM, s  ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ).
• (¬ψ)M ∈ N(s). Similar to the second case, we can derive thatM, s  ∆(ϕ ∧
ψ).
Proposition 17. LetMc be a canonical model forR∆. ThenMc possesses the prop-
erty (i). As a corollary, (Mc)+ also possesses the property (i).
Proof. Suppose X ∈ N c(s) and Y ∈ N c(s), to show that X ∩ Y ∈ N c(s). By
supposition, there existϕ andχ such thatX = |ϕ| and Y = |χ|, and then∆(ϕ∨ψ) ∈ s
for everyψ, and∆(χ∨ψ) ∈ s for everyψ. Using axiom∆C, we infer∆((ϕ∧χ)∨ψ) ∈
s for every ψ. Therefore, |ϕ ∧ χ| ∈ N c(s), i.e. X ∩ Y ∈ N c(s). Then it follows that
(Mc)+ also possesses the property (i) from Prop. 12.
The results below are now immediate, due to Thm. 15 and Prop. 17.
Theorem 18. R∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of quasi-
filters.
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Proposition 19. LetMc be a canonical model for (EMN)∆. ThenMc possesses the
property (n). As a corollary, (Mc)+ also possesses (n).
Theorem 20. (EMN)∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of
frames satisfying (s)&(n).
It is straightforward to obtain the following result.
Theorem 21. K∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of filters.
By constructing countermodels, we can obtain the following cube, which summar-
izes the deductive powers of the systems in this paper. An arrow from a system S1 to
another S2 means that S2 is deductively stronger than S1.
R
∆ // K
∆
M
∆
??
⑧
⑧
⑧
// (EMN)∆
??
⑧
⑧
⑧
(EC)∆
OO
// (ECN)∆
OO
E
∆ //
??
⑧
⑧
OO
(EN)∆
??
⑧
⑧
OO
5 Reflection: how does the function λ arise?
As noted, in order to show the completeness of proof systems including∆M, a crucial
part is to define a suitable canonical function, i.e. N c, which is inspired by the function
λ in [11]. The λ is very important for the definition of canonical relation and thus
for the completeness proof in the cited paper. It is this function that helps find simple
axiomatizations for the minimal contingency logic and transitive contingency logic
under Kripke semantics, so to speak. Despite its importance, the author did not say any
intuitive idea about λ. And this functionwas thought of as ‘ingenious’ creation by some
other researchers, say Humberstone [10, p. 118] and Fan, Wang and van Ditmarch [8,
p. 101]. But how does the function arise? In this section, we unfold the mystery of λ,
and show that it is actually equal to a related function λ proposed in Humberstone [9].
To show completeness of minimal non-contingency logic under Kripke semantics,
Humberstone [9, p. 219] defined the canonical relation Rc as xRcy iff λ(x) ⊆ y,
where, denoted by H’s λ,
λ(x) = {ϕ | ∆ϕ ∈ x and ∀ψ such that ⊢ ϕ→ ψ,∆ψ ∈ x}.2
The reason for defining the function λ in such a way, is that the author would like to
‘simulate’ the canonical relation of the minimal modal logic, which is defined via xRy
iff λ(x) ⊆ y, where λ(x) = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ x}. This can be seen from several passages:
The intuitive idea is that for x ∈W , λ(x) is the set of formulas which are necessary
at x.
2In the definition of λ, Humberstone used A and B rather than ϕ and ψ, respectively. To maintain the
consistency of notation in this paper, we here use ϕ and ψ instead.
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· · ·
The idea of the entry condition on A, that only such A (with ∆A ∈ x) should be
labeled as Necessary if all their consequences are non-contingent, is that · · · , those
non-contingencies which qualify as such because they, rather than their negations, are
necessary and have only non-contingent consequences, since those consequences are
themselves necessary. [9, p. 219]
Then the function λ was simplified, and accordingly, the completeness proof was
simplified in [11]. There, λ(x), denoted by K’s λ, is defined as:
λ(x) = {ϕ | ∀ψ,∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ x}.
In the sequel, we will demonstrate that, in fact, K’s λ is equal to H’s λ.
To begin with, notice that ⊢ ϕ → ϕ, thus the part following ‘and’ in the H’s λ
definition entails∆ϕ ∈ x. Therefore, the H’s λ(x) is equal to a simplified version:
λ(x) = {ϕ | ∀ψ such that ⊢ ϕ→ ψ,∆ψ ∈ x}.
Then it is sufficient to show that the simplified λ is further equal to K’s λ, even in
the setting of arbitrary neighborhood contingency logics (as opposed to Kripke contin-
gency logics).
Proposition 22. Let x be a maximal consistent set. Given the rule RE∆, the following
statements are equivalent.3
(1) For every ψ such that ⊢ ϕ→ ψ, ∆ψ ∈ x.
(2) For every ψ,∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ x.
Proof. (1) =⇒ (2): suppose (1) holds. Since ⊢ ϕ → ϕ ∨ ψ, then it is immediate by
(1) that ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ x, namely (2).
(2) =⇒ (1): suppose (2) holds, to show (1). For this, assume that ⊢ ϕ → ψ, then
⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ ↔ ψ, by RE∆, ⊢ ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ↔ ∆ψ. By (2), we obtain that ∆ψ ∈ x, as
desired.
6 Concluding Discussions
In this note, by defining suitable neighborhood canonical functions, we presented a se-
quence of contingency logics under neighborhood semantics. In particular, inspired by
Kuhn’s function λ in [11], we defined a desired canonical neighborhood function, and
then axiomatized monotone contingency logic and regular contingency logic and other
logics including the axiom ∆M, thereby answering two open questions raised in [1].
We then reflected on the function λ, and showed that it is actually equal to Humber-
stone’s function λ in [9], even in the setting of arbitrary neighborhood contingency
logics.
Moreover, as we observe, in M∆, ∆M can be replaced by ∆ϕ → ∆(ϕ → ψ) ∨
∆(¬ϕ → χ), and in R∆, ∆C can be replaced by ∆(ψ → ϕ) ∧ ∆(¬ψ → ϕ) →
3RE∆ is just (∆Cong) in [9].
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∆ϕ.4 Thus we can also adopt these two alternative formulas to axiomatize monotone
contingency logic and regular contingency logic. Therefore, it was wrong to claim that
“one cannot fill these gaps with the axioms ∆ϕ → ∆(ϕ → ψ) ∨ ∆(¬ϕ → χ) and
∆(ψ → ϕ) ∧∆(¬ψ → ϕ)→ ∆ϕ” on [1, p. 62].
Recall that an ‘almost definability’ schema, ∇χ → (ϕ ↔ (∆ϕ ∧∆(χ → ϕ))),
is proposed in [7], and shown in [8] to be applied to axiomatize contingency logic
over much more Kripke frame classes than Kuhn’s function λ and other variations.
Therefore, it may be natural to ask if the schema can also work in the neighborhood
setting. The canonical neighborhood function inspired by the schema seems to be
N(s) = {|ϕ| | ∆ϕ ∧∆(ψ → ϕ) ∈ s for some∇ψ ∈ s}.
Unfortunately the answer seems to be negative. The reason can be explained as follows.
Although N c in Def. 8 is almost monotonic in the sense that if |ϕ| ∈ N c(s) and
|ϕ| ⊆ |ψ|, then |ψ| ∈ N c(s), as can be easily seen from the proof of Lemma 13, in
contrast, as one may easily verify, N is not almost monotonic in the above sense, i.e.,
it fails that if |ϕ| ∈ N(s) and |ϕ| ⊆ |ψ|, then |ψ| ∈ N(s). This can also explain why
N c works well for monotone and regular contingency logics and other logics including
the axiom ∆M. Despite this fact, this N c does not apply to systems excluding the
axiom∆M, since we need this axiom to ensure the truth lemma (Lemma 10). It is also
worth noting that thisN c is smaller than that in the case of classical contingency logic
(Def. 2), thus we cannot address all neighborhood contingency logics in a unified way.5
This indicates that the completeness proofs of these logics are nontrivial. Besides, N c
seems not workable for proper extensions ofK∆, which we leave for future work.
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